Lecture � MAS962 Theory theory

Greg Detre

Tuesday, November 19, 2002

 

there�s a really good web page on critiques of gopnik�s paper, including carey + spelke�s

 

Presentation on Gopnik � Josh Tenenbaum (faculty, BCS)

Gopnik: theories as less impoverished/localised representations of meaning/knowledge structures

Gopnik + Carey � both advocates of theory theory

Gopnik � bi-directional

Kuhn � hard to objectively measure progress in science, emphasised the social, accidental and cognitive aspects of science (in the face of a more logicist philosophy of science approach)

what you see in the data depends on what paradigm you�re working within

influenced by Gestalt and Piaget

Gopnik is influenced by Kuhn, but revising/attacking Piaget

there�s this circularity between analogies of theory formation between scientist as child and child as scientist, when we don�t really know much about theory formation in either

interesting but vague � what do they really mean by a �theory� etc.?

Push: model of the child as a society of scientists?

Gopnik�s (two distinct) claims:

1.      children�s knowledge structures are like theories

2.      process of conceptual development is like the process of theory change in science

she doesn�t want to separate these

what is a theory?

more than just an �empirical generalisation�

linear relationship between height + weight � is that just an empirical generalisation?

but they aren�t symmetric � we want to plot height (as independent variable) along the bottom

but that�s because it�s easier to evaluate height, I�ve seen more things than I�ve weighed

but it also depends on what problem you�re trying answer

he prefers height along the x, because you think more of weight as a function of height

but you could also see it in terms of a causal model, with implicit variables like genetics, childhood nutrition and current diet � causal models

Gopnik�s now really interested in causal learning in terms of Bayesian algorithms

considers that they might be innate

a causal model provides explanation

you�ve added the arrowheads, i.e. one-way directedness

no way to distinguish direction of causality based on correlation alone

how much of this discussion arises because they want theories to be compact/elegant?

or at least a compact core�

tradeoff between complexity + fitting the data

Schultz + Gopnik � experiments to show that children understand causal logic

mechanisms of theory change

evidence-driven

relatively orderly, predictable, constrained process

theory formation is an �effective computational procedure�, a �logic of discovery�

Gopnik doesn�t like neural networks � because she thinks that learning isn�t incremental, but has discontinuities

isn�t this a misunderstanding about how neural nets work???

she seems to think that the new theory, which had been just applied to special cases, expands to apply to all � it grows out of the old

example of theory change � theory of mind

2.5-3 � understand mind in terms of desires and perception, and perception is veridical

4 year olds � understand mind in terms of desires and beliefs, which may be false

Deb: is there a similar change when children realise that people may be masking their desires?

Josh: presumably there could also be a �false desire� test

the mystery of theory change

with incorrect theory, children ignore or misinterpret counter-evidence � but what then causes theory change?

they could be keeping track of it in their heads, of course

in science, it could be because you have better technology, or a glut of counter-evidence � in children, the closest thing you have is improvements in perceptual/cognitive mechanisms (e.g. short term memory etc.)

why is theory change so much quicker and more regular in development than science?

because it�s designed

it�s easier

and science is pretty regular (see calculus, evolution etc.)

she argues against reflection as the origin of theory change

but when you�re building theories, you�re learning methods of theory revision

in philosophy of science, reflection often comes from thought experiments

Barbara: how do you know when your theory has become too complex and needs revision?

Presentation on Carey � Tom

Carey wants to dispute Gopnik�s claim about �theories all the way down� � as deep as you analyse knowledge that children have, that knowledge has the character of a theory

does a theory have to be revisable?

Carey disagrees, saying it doesn�t, because core knowledge is non-revisable, so if it�s a theory then Gopnik�s definition is too strong

Tom: or is it? what�s wrong with Gopnik�s definition?

Gopnik: intervention is the key to discovering causal relationships

�did you ever hear of the dog ringing the bell?�

Deb: that doesn�t seem quite right, because his dog used to pull on the leash to get him to go for a walk, but the dog never pushed on the leash

Garcia effect: rat to learn that a funny taste is associated with sickness on a single trial, flashing lights with shock, but you can�t get them to learn other effects so easily � they learn some things more readily than others � you�re exploiting some other system

Deb: in the A-not-B error experiments, do they look at eye-tracking?

if you turn out the lights, rather than hiding for them in the wrong place, very young children reach for the right place, apparently - ???

you can track up to 4 moving balls, but not 5

Deb: there�s an argument that that�s why there are no verbs in any language with 5 arguments

Williams syndrome � don�t have the capacity for conceptual change in many other ways, but at the age of 4, they pick up the beliefs/desires psychology � Carey: so it�s as though that specific theory formation mechanism is an embellishment of the core knowledge system rather than just a general theory

core knowledge is encapsulated � can�t do abduction

 

 

Questions

how does the discussion of children as scientists relate to theory theory and campbell�s contrast of it (i.e. as some neural substrate for a certain type of situation-independent tacit knowledge, or something???) with simulation???

can you say that a theory has to be linguistically expressible???

well, what would that add???

adds abstraction/generalisability, communicability, makes things fixed/precise, formalisable

introspectively feels diff

tracking/Kalman filtering???